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   INTRODUCTION 
 
Global  security  and  stability  requires  a 
significant public investment. Deficiencies 
and  shortfalls  in  capabilities  to  ensure 
security and stability result from underin-
vestment  in  defence,  assuming  that 
available  budgets  are  efficiently  and 
effectively employed. 
Failing  to  allocate  resources  to  national 
defence  capabilities  invariably  results  in 
security deficits. Regrets for weak or failing 
states are often swift and sweeping: loss of 
sovereignty or a hostile takeover by non-
state actors. More sophisticated states will 
amortise  their  cost  through  multilateral 
Security Organisations like the UN, NATO 
or the EU: they attempt to “insource” their 
security  needs  to  other  states.  Given  the 
very  nature  of  multilateralism  though, 
sharing  benefits  doesn’t  work  without 
sharing  the  burden.  But  “sharing  the 
burden” has become more than a political 
mantra.  With  global  economics  as  a 
background,  a  new  trend  has  set  in, 
exacerbated  by  the  recent  downturn  in 
public  finances:  critical  and  enabling 
capabilities are either provided in kind by a 
partner, or paid for by the others. Failing 
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Recurrent  and  systematic  underin-
vestment  (or  inadequate  management) 
results in capability shortfalls, that can 
only  be  compensated  by  ‘outsourcing’ 
to  Private  Military  Companies.  While 
the  use  of  private  companies  for 
corporate or logistic functions might be 
manageable,  complementary  and 
legitimate,  outsour-cing  inherently 
governmental  functions  as  the  use  of 
force to hired guns inevitably leads to 
legal, military and political issues. Even 
with  an  adequate  management 
structure, not all military functions can 
be  privatized,  since  activities  or 
functions  linked  with  the  state’s 
monopoly  on  the  (authorised)  use  of 
force as well as core military mission-
critical  functions  should  be  banned 
from privatization. 
Assuredly,  Defence  &  Security  inves-
tments deserve a better outcome than 
keeping  the  balance  sheets  of  private 
companies in the green: critical aware-
ness  and  an  independent  knowledge 
base on the good, the bad and the ugly 
of  hiring  Private  Military  Companies 
can make the difference for our future 
(austere) defence budgets between pro-
active investments in the provision of 
public security or compelled recourse to 
private capabilities.  
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to invest in collective defence capabilities 
subsequently  leads  to  shortfalls,  that 
cannot  even  be  mutualised  through 
multilateral  cooperation:  recurrent  and 
systematic underinvestment (or inadequate 
management) result in capability shortfalls, 
that  can  only  be  compensated  by 
“outsourcing”  to  Private  Military 
Companies (PMC). This article will argue 
that — while the use of private companies 
for corporate or logistic functions might be 
manageable,  complementary  and 
legitimate —  outsourcing  inherently 
governmental functions such as the use of 
force to hired guns inevitably leads to legal, 
military and political issues. 
THE  ORIGINS  OF  PRIVATE  SECURITY 
AND OUTSOURCED MILITARY LOGISTICS 
 
Allegiance to a king or to his money has 
made the distinction between patriots and 
mercenaries for centuries. Even the Swiss-
guard-close-protection-detail  of  the  pope, 
taking root in 1506
1 can be considered as 
an  early  Private  Security  Company,  albeit 
one with an unpublished balance sheet. 
During the World wars, private companies 
were used for logistics and transportation 
purposes  only.  Vietnam  saw  the  first 
application of civilian technical specialists 
as  maintainers  of  sophisticated  weapon 
systems.  The  concept  of  using  civilian 
specialists “backstage”, i.e. in principle not 
for combat functions or even close to the 
frontline,  remained  applicable  during  the 
cold  war.  This  is  not  to  say  that 
paramilitaries  led  by  warlords  and 
mercenaries were not employed by warring 
parties  and  sometimes  by  legitimate 
governments, especially in Africa. 
The  (1990-1991)  Gulf  War  can  be 
considered as the first massive application 
                                                 
1 History of the Swiss mercenaries, retrieved 6 Aug 2008 from 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/swiss_guard/swissguard/s
toria_en.htm. 
of Private Companies, routinely embedded 
in support and maintenance arrangements. 
It  can  also  be  argued  that  military 
operations  in  Bosnia,  Sierra  Leone, 
Kosovo,  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  could  not 
have been conducted without the help of 
contractors. 
As was captured by the Geneva Centre for 
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DCAF) in a paper
2 on the matter: “Not 
since the 17th century has there been such 
a  reliance  on  private  military  actors  to 
accomplish  tasks  directly  affecting  the 
success  of  military  engagements.  Private 
contractors are now so firmly embedded in 
intervention, peacekeeping, and occupation 
that  this  trend  has  arguably  reached  the 
point of no return.” 
To understand the origins and the success 
of private companies, both the viewpoints 
of demand and supply should be taken into 
account. 
One  the  one  hand,  declining  budgets 
compel  Chiefs  of  Defence  to  shed  non-
core activities. When these capabilities are 
then required, outsourcing is often the only 
option.  Since  defence  establishments 
cannot afford the “luxury” of avoiding risk 
by  building t h e s e   own  capabilities  with 
buffers and redundancy, they are squeezed 
into risk management. 
On  the  supply  side,  the  sunset  of 
conscription  has  professionalised  most 
Armed  Forces.  To  avoid  unfavourable 
pyramids  of  age  in  their  order  of  battle, 
military personnel is often encouraged to 
leave  the  ranks  and  seek  civilian  career-
opportunities.  This,  together  with  the 
downsizing of the armed forces caused by 
aforementioned  budget  cuts,  floods  the 
job-market  with  middle  age  “specialists” 
                                                 
2 CAPARINI, M. & SCHREIER, F., Privatising Security: Law, Practice 
and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies (Geneva, 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005).  
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with a security clearance and an inherent 
sense of discipline, ready to be enrolled by 
Private Military Companies. 
Clearly,  where  offer  and  demand  for 
military  outsourcing  meet,  a  thriving 
market has emerged. 
A  CLASSIFICTATION  OF  DEFENCE  & 
SECURITY RELATED OUTSOURCING 
 
In  essence,  four  types  of  “entities” t o  
which military or security-related tasks are 
outsourced  can  be  characterised  and 
distinguished, as follows: 
(1)  Private  Security  Companies 
(protect against the use of force, defensive 
in nature); 
(2)  Private  Militia’s  and/or  non-state 
actors  (enable  use  of  force,  offensive  in 
nature, can significantly impact on strategic 
situations and regional balance of power  ); 
(3)  Private Military Logistic Companies 
(PM(L)C —  support  Defence  &  Security 
planning and operations); 
(4)  Military  Industrial  Support 
Companies  (enable  future  Defence  & 
Security efforts). 
Closer  analysis  of  the  mission  types  and 
tasks, depicted graphically in Fig 1, shows 
two main axes of differentiation, namely : 
•  the scale of violence involved in the 
activities; 
•  the  timescale  of  the  effects  they 
produce. 
Some  contracts  are  responsive  to  an 
“urgent  operational  requirement”:  hence, 
they  can  be  promptly  awarded  and 
generally  do  not  involve  a  long  term 
commitment  to  a  particular  company, 
while  other  affiliations  with  industrial 
partners  produce  long  term  effects  and 
require  a  stable,  trustworthy  business 
relationship. 
Furthermore, as can be seen on the graph 
below, one strand of outsourced activities 
provide t h e  capability  for  the  use  of  force, 
while  the  other  is  merely  intended  to 
transfer this capability, but does not directly 
involve any application of violence. 
This rather complex, but nuanced way of 
classifying  Private  Military  activities  is 
necessary,  because  the  definition  of  a 
“mercenary” provided in Protocol I of the 
Geneva Conventions — relevant as it may 
have been when it was negotiated — raises 
more  questions  than  it  provides  answers, 
when used in today’s security environment 
with  its  own  political  realities.  Although 
international law bans mercenary activities, 
their definition has not been transformed 
to reflect the current environment in which 
they take place: hence, none is universally 
accepted and would therefore constitute a 
legal  basis  for  enforcement  and 
prosecution in a court of law. Furthermore, 
international  law  and  the  conventions 
dealing with the notion of mercenaries do 
not adequately address the use of PSCs by 
a sovereign state.  
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Figure 1: Graphical taxonomy of defence & security related outsourcing 
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A MILITARY ANALYSIS  OF  THE USE  OF 
PMCS IN OPERATIONS 
 
One  of  the  first  observers  to  grasp  the 
impact of PMCs on military operations was 
Peter W. Singer. In his landmark essay
3, he 
develops  the  perspective  of  “Corporate 
Warriors”,  with  the  Balkan  wars  and  a 
plethora  of  African  conflicts  as  a 
background. 
After  several  incidents  had  involved 
Private  Security  Companies  in  Iraq  and 
Afghanistan  with  negative  media  fallout 
toward American efforts on both theatres, 
the US Congress decided to investigate the 
outsourcing  operations  by  the  State 
Department  and  the  Department  of 
Defense. 
During the Committee hearings
4, the tone 
on the utility of outsourcing to the military 
effort was set with following statement by 
Congressman Tierney: “Outsourcing seems 
to increase the costs, not decrease it. [...] It 
seems  to  be  harming  the  very 
counterinsurgency  effort  that  General 
Petraeus seems to want to implement, and 
we have far too few Government managers 
to oversee the situation.” 
The  incidents  attributed  to  Blackwater  in 
the  congressional  findings  should  indeed 
be analysed against the background of the 
manual  on  Counterinsurgency  written  by 
                                                 
3 SINGER, P., Corporate Warriors: the Rise of the Privatized Military 
Industry (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2003). 
4 C o m m i t t e e  H e a r i n g s  o f  t h e  H o u s e  o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  — 
Hearing on Blackwater USA on 2 Oct 2007. Retrieved 3 Aug 
2008 from: 
www.oversight.house.gov/documents/20071127131151. 
Gen. Petraeus
5 on behalf of the US Army 
in  2006:  “Counterinsurgents  that  use 
excessive  force  to  limit  near  term  risk 
alienate  the  local  populace.  They  deprive 
themselves of support or tolerance of the 
people.  This  situation  is  what  insurgents 
want. It increases the threat they pose.” 
Analysis  of  the  Congressional  hearings 
further  reveals  that  Blackwater  and  other 
companies  conducted  their  missions  in 
ways totally opposed to the highest military 
commander’s  intent  (coincidentally, 
General  Petraeus  at  the  time)  without 
reneging their contractual obligations. 
The  fact  that  contractors  in  the  Area  of 
Operations are not under direct control of 
the  military  command  obviously  goes 
against  one  of  the  first  principles  of 
military  operations —  unity  of 
command —  and  is  therefore  not  only 
inefficient  and  dangerous,  but 
unacceptable, if executive accountability is 
to be achieved at any rate. 
As recognised by David Isenberg
6, checks 
and balances that apply to national armed 
forces  can  seldom  be  applied  with 
equivalent  strength  to  PMC-employees. 
Since  PM(L)C-employees  are  exempt  of 
military  command  and  justice,  they  are 
under no obligation to operate at risk and 
can  suspend  a  contract  if —  either  in 
financial or physical terms — the situation 
is  judged  “too  risky”.  Furthermore, 
                                                 
5 US Army Field Man 3-24, Counterinsurgency. (Petraeus, 2006) 
retrieved 24 Aug 2008 from: 
www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-  24 
6 ISENBERG, D., A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic 
Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq (London, BASIC, 
2004).  
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PM(L)Cs face no real risk of prosecution, 
if they or their employees defect without 
regard to any military rationale from their 
contractual obligations. 
All  of  this  makes  the  use  of  PMCs  in 
combat  situations  ineffective  and  even 
dangerous, especially if regular troops are 
to protect them. 
A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF 
PMCS 
 
The events involving PMCs in the Balkans, 
Iraq  and  Afghanistan  have  not  only 
prompted  the  US C o n g r e s s
7  and  the 
Government  Accountability  Office
8 t o  
increased  scrutiny,  but  also  other 
legislators, notably Canadian
9 and Dutch
10. 
These thorough reviews provide significant 
insight  in  all  the  potential  problems  and 
issues of outsourcing security in a broader 
and possibly multi-lateral context. Analysis 
of  their  findings  demonstrate  that 
outsourcing  private  security  has  as  many 
profound implications as apparent motives: 
-  When  used  to  circumvent  the 
need  for  backing  by  parliament  and 
public,  political  check-and-balance 
mechanisms are often shunted, but seldom 
for good reasons. Multilateral consultation 
and  support  is  emptied  of  its  contents, 
while the need to justify intervention vis-à-
vis the international community is avoided; 
-  If  the  capability-calculus  is 
negative without outsourcing, overstretch 
will  likely  follow,  either  in  economical 
terms  (when  the  taxpayers  start  asking 
                                                 
7 C o n g r e s s i o n a l  R e s e a r c h  S e r v i c e  R e p o r t  P r i v a t e  S e c u r i t y  
Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status and Other Issues. 
Retrieved  31  Jul  2008  from  www.fas.org/sgp/congr  research 
serv/natsec/RL32419. 
8  DOD's  Extensive  Use  of  Logistics  Support  Contracts  Requires 
Strengthened Oversight (Washington, GAO, 2004). 
9  Employing  Private  Military  Companies  (The  Hague,  Adviesraad 
Internationale Vraagstukken, 2007). 
10 Canadian Department of National Defense, Evaluation of the 
Canadian Forces Contractor Augmentation Program, 2006. 
questions) or in military terms (when body 
bags start to affect recruitment and public 
support); 
-  When  misused  to  seek  official 
deniability,  both  political  and  public 
scrutiny  are  negated.  This,  in  turn, 
undermines  the  credibility  of  the 
government  and  trust  between  executive 
branches,  since  the  links  closest  to  the 
contractor  tasking  authority  will  be  most 
vulnerable  to  media  exposure  and  legal 
action; 
-  When  justified  by  budget 
considerations,  outsourcing  should  go 
hand in hand with open bidding practices 
and contractual orthodoxy, for the lack of 
either  will  lead  to  squandering  of  public 
money,  mismanagement,  and  will 
ultimately  shortchange  defence  budgets, 
that  could  otherwise  be  spent  on 
transforming  official  Armed  Forces,  in 
other words on “insourcing”; 
-  When  optimising  operational 
capabilities  is  the  motive,  cost 
management is the key to its added value, 
since  private  companies  have  but  one 
motive:  profit.  The  mechanics  of  profit 
being  rather  simple,  either  more  quantity 
(i.e. more conflict) or less quality (i.e. less 
security) are the two most natural culprits 
of deficient cost management;  
-  When  transparency  is  being 
eschewed through outsourcing, it normally 
follows a political decision by the executive 
power.  Military  control  and  civilian 
oversight — the only mechanisms that can 
restore  it — w ill  have  been  curtailed  or 
neutralised. Resulting political damage will 
induce  negative  perceptions  of  both 
mechanisms  and  their  associated 
leadership, but history has shown that legal 
action will usually not address the ones that 
ordered the stealthiness; 
-  When  accountability  is  shunned, 
political  and  legal  liabilities  often  ensue. 
International law has it that the conduct of 
“agents  operating  within  the  scope  of  a  state’s  
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authority” is attributable to its government. 
Transparency and accountability being the 
main hallmarks of good governance, they 
can  safeguard  the  sending  state  of  legal 
complications if they are enshrined in its 
outsourcing  practices.  Failing  to  enforce 
them however, can significantly curtail the 
political  leeway  of  that  state  (as 
negotiations  for  a  Status  Of  Forces 
Agreement [SOFA] in Iraq demonstrated, 
when  PMC’s  were  explicitly  denied 
immunity);  
-  The  same  can  be  said  when 
outsourcing is used to perform inherently 
governmental  functions.  If  the  sending 
state  fails  to  prosecute  criminal  or 
fraudulent activities of its contractors or to 
suspend  the  execution  of  the  contract 
when  the  scope  of  its  authority  is 
exceeded, political and legal difficulties are 
to  be  expected.  Indeed,  beside  a  generic 
international legal framework, specific legal 
arrangements  tailored  to  regional  &  local 
circumstances are necessary to harmonise 
different levels of jurisdiction and a legal 
framework  that  has  not  adapted  to  the 
security realities of failed states and actors 
that play by their own rules. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Providing  policies  and  practices  with 
regard to outsourcing security are granted 
sufficient regulatory attention and specific 
treatment  (i.e.  not  as  any-other-contract), 
specialised  multilateral  agencies  such  as 
European  Defence  Agency  (EDA)  and 
NATO  Maintenance  and  Supply 
Organization  (NAMSA)  seem  to  provide 
the  best  guarantees  against  undue  “pork-
barrel”  politics.  Furthermore,  through  a 
consolidated  multinational  approach, 
smaller  nations  can  leverage  capabilities, 
which  they  would  otherwise  not  have 
committed  and  the  UN  is  in  a  better 
position  to  seek  adhesion  from  less-
developed countries to their peacekeeping 
endeavours. 
But  improving  outsourcing  outcomes 
requires a “management model”, if not one 
common  to  the  different  Security 
Organisations (NATO, the EU, the United 
Nations,  ...),  then  certainly  a  trustworthy 
“interoperable  model”,  that  nations  can 
easily plug into. 
Finding political consensus for this model 
would probably be perilous in any of the 
organisations that may be concerned by it. 
But precisely the need for consensus is the 
most  likely  reason  that  concerted  and 
timely action will be the exception rather 
than the rule. 
Arguably,  if  the  arrangements  on 
Permanent Structured Cooperation in the 
Treaty  of  Lisbon
11  are  to  be  realistically 
fulfilled, groups of nations that will join in 
initial action within a period of five to 30 days 
with  support  elements  including  transport  and 
logistics, shall only be able to do so if they 
are  supported  by  contractors  and  be 
extended  up  to  at  least  120  days  if  they  can 
subsequently  handover  to  multilateral 
partners ... and (more) contractors. 
All  told,  one  overarching  conclusion  and 
recommendation  seems  to  emerge  from 
the analysis: 
 
 
 
If you cannot control 
Private (Military) 
Companies,  
don’t hire them ! 
 
 
                                                 
11 Article 1 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation 
established by article 42 of the Treaty on the European Union  
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